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Abstract
We consider economies with incomplete markets, one good per state,
two periods, t = 0;1, private ownership of initial endowments, a single
ﬁrm, and no assets other than shares in this ﬁrm. In Dierker, Dierker,
Grodal (2002), we give an example of such an economy in which all market
equilibria are constrained ineﬃcient. In this paper, we weaken the concept
of constrained eﬃciency by taking away the planner’s right to determine
consumers’ investments. An allocation is called minimally constrained ef-
ﬁcient if a planner, who can only determine the production plan and the
distribution of consumption at t = 0, cannot ﬁnd a Pareto improvement.
We present an example with arbitrarily small income eﬀects in which no
market equilibrium is minimally constrained eﬃcient.
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11 Introduction
We consider ﬁnance economies with production. More precisely, we assume in-
complete markets, one good per state, private ownership of initial endowments,
production, and two time periods. Due to the incompleteness of markets, share-
holders typically disagree about which production decision their ﬁrm should take.
Dr` eze (1974) presents a way of resolving the conﬂict among shareholders by in-
troducing an equilibrium concept that is based on Pareto comparisons with the
aim of achieving constrained eﬃciency. We restrict ourselves to economies with
one good per state in order to rule out price eﬀects, which are a well-known cause
of constrained ineﬃciency [cf. Geanakoplos et al. (1990)].
In this paper, we show that the market in such economies may not be able to
achieve an allocation that satisﬁes minimal eﬃciency requirements as soon as the
quasilinear framework is left. This phenomenon is illustrated in economies with
only one ﬁrm.
The ﬁrm has constant returns to scale and makes zero proﬁt. Its state depen-
dent output at t = 1 is sold on the asset market in exchange for the corresponding
input. When the ﬁrm proposes a production ray, consumers choose their optimal
investments and this determines their consumption in all states. The ﬁrm adjusts
its production level to the market clearing scale. The resulting allocation is called
a market equilibrium. The set of all allocations the market can achieve consists
of all market equilibria corresponding to some production decision of the ﬁrm.
A Dr` eze equilibrium is a market equilibrium with the following property:
The (new) shareholders of the ﬁrm meet at t = 0 after they have chosen their
shares optimally. If these shares are held ﬁxed, there is no other production
plan such that the shareholders of the ﬁrm can achieve a Pareto improvement
by adopting that production plan and by making sidepayments at time t = 0 to
reach unanimity.1
Constrained eﬃciency means that a hypothetical planner cannot ﬁnd a Pareto
improvement by simultaneously choosing the production plan, the shares, and
each individual’s consumption at t = 0. Note that a constrained eﬃcient market
equilibrium is a Dr` eze equilibrium.
An example of an economy with a unique, but constrained ineﬃcient Dr` eze
equilibrium is presented in Dierker, Dierker, and Grodal, henceforth DDG, (2002).
This example is driven by the existence of a consumer whose preferences exhibit
strong income eﬀects. If there are no income eﬀects, that is to say, if all consumers
have quasilinear utility functions, then at least one constrained eﬃcient Dr` eze
1For an extensive treatment of Dr` eze equilibria in a setting with private ownership of initial
endowments, the reader is referred to Magill and Quinzii (1996), chapter 6.
2equilibrium exists, since the social surplus is well deﬁned and is maximized at a
Dr` eze equilibrium.
Since the planner, who can implement constrained eﬃcient allocations, is
more powerful than the market, we reduce the planner’s power substantially and
explore whether the planner can still outperform the market. We introduce the
following very weak version of constrained eﬃciency, in which tomorrow’s con-
sumption can only be aﬀected by the planner through the choice of the production
plan. After the planner has chosen a production plan with input normalized to -1,
consumers choose their optimal investments subject to their budget constraints.
The ﬁrm adjusts production to the market clearing scale. The planner, who is no
longer allowed to alter individual consumption at t = 1, can only distribute the
resources remaining at t = 0 after subtracting the input. An allocation is called
minimally constrained eﬃcient if the planner, who is subject to these constraints,
cannot ﬁnd a Pareto improvement. It turns out that the example in DDG (2002)
is minimally constrained eﬃcient.
However, there are economies without any minimally constrained eﬃcient
allocations. To show this, we start with a quasilinear economy with three Dr` eze
equilibria. Two of them are surplus maxima and the third is a surplus minimum.
Then we perturb the quasilinear utility functions of the example by adding a
small term to the utility at t = 0. The perturbation does not aﬀect the way
in which future consumption streams are ranked, i.e., utility at t = 1 is left
unchanged. These small perturbations leave the set of Dr` eze equilibria invariant.
However, for arbitrarily small perturbations, all Dr` eze equilibria, and hence all
market equilibria, become minimally constrained ineﬃcient.
The notion of minimal constrained eﬃciency cannot be weakened further,
since the planner should at least retain the possibility of changing the production
plan and redistributing total consumption at t = 0. We conclude that, even in
economies with one good per state, arbitrarily small income eﬀects can make it
impossible to select a production plan that achieves a market equilibrium that
satisﬁes at least some weak version of constrained eﬃciency. The question of how
to choose a market equilibrium remains open and is brieﬂy discussed at the end
of the paper.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce
the framework and present the deﬁnitions. In Section 3 we give an example
showing that minimally constrained eﬃcient market equilibria need not exist.
Section 4 contains concluding remarks.
32 Framework and Deﬁnitions
The reason why the market mechanism can be unable to generate allocations that
exhibit desirable eﬃciency properties can be illustrated in a very simple setting.
We consider two periods, t = 0;1, and two possible states of nature at t = 1,
denoted s = 1 and s = 2, respectively. The unique state at t = 0 is included
as the state s = 0. There is a single good, denoted s, in each state s = 0;1;2
and there is just one ﬁrm. It transforms good 0 into a state dependent output
at t = 1. We assume that there are no assets other than shares in the ﬁrm. The
ﬁrm has constant returns to scale and makes zero proﬁts. Its technology is given
by a family of normalized production plans (¡1;¸;1 ¡ ¸). The production set is
Y = f®(¡1;¸;1 ¡ ¸) 2 R
3 j ® ¸ 0; 0 · ¸ · ¸ · ¸ · 1g:
There are two types of consumers. Ideally, each type is represented by a
continuum of mass 1. For convenience, we refer to each continuum of identical
consumers as a single consumer denoted i = 1;2. Consumer i has the initial
endowment ei, consumption set R3
+, and utility function Ui.
If the ﬁrm selects the normalized production plan (¡1;¸;1¡¸) and consumer
i chooses the investment ®i ¸ 0 in the ﬁrm, the resulting consumption bundle









If the utility functions are strictly quasiconcave, i’s optimal investment ®i(¸) is
uniquely determined. Agent i consumes xi(¸) = ei + ®i(¸)(¡1;¸;1 ¡ ¸), holds
shares #i(¸) = ®i(¸)=(®1(¸) + ®2(¸)), and the ﬁrm produces y(¸) = [®1(¸) +
®2(¸)](¡1;¸;1 ¡ ¸).
Deﬁnition . The allocation (y(¸);x1(¸);x2(¸)) is called a market equilibrium iﬀ
1) xi(¸) = ei + ®i(¸)(¡1;¸;1 ¡ ¸), where ®i(¸) is i’s optimal investment at the
production ray ¸,
2) y(¸) = [®1(¸) + ®2(¸)](¡1;¸;1 ¡ ¸) 2 Y .
Market equilibria are the only allocations that the market can achieve. In
general, these allocations cannot be Pareto compared and the shareholders face
a social choice problem. In order to resolve the problem, Dr` eze (1974) suggested
that shareholders use sidepayments among themselves at t = 0 in order to reach
unanimity.
A Dr` eze equilibrium is a market equilibrium in which the production plan of
the ﬁrm passes the following test: It is impossible for the shareholders to ﬁnd
another production plan and sidepayments at t = 0 such that all shareholders are
better oﬀ if they use their original investment levels and get the sidepayments.2
2In the usual deﬁnition of a Dr` eze equilibrium, shares #i, and not the investment levels ®i,
are taken as ﬁxed when a production plan is evaluated. The two deﬁnitions are equivalent.
4More precisely, consider a market equilibrium (y(˜ ¸);x1(˜ ¸);x2(˜ ¸)) with respect to
˜ ¸ and let I = fi j ®i(˜ ¸) > 0g. The market equilibrium is a Dr` eze equilibrium if
it is impossible to ﬁnd a normalized production plan (¡1;¸;1¡¸) and a system
of sidepayments (¿i)i2I at t = 0 with
P





i(˜ ¸)(¡1;¸;1 ¡ ¸)) > U
i(x
i(˜ ¸))
for every i 2 I. Note that the production plan (¡1;¸;1¡¸) on the left hand side
of the above inequality is multiplied by the investment level ®i(˜ ¸) that is optimal
at the normalized equilibrium production plan (¡1; ˜ ¸;1 ¡ ˜ ¸).
We recall the deﬁnitions of constrained feasibility and constrained eﬃciency
[cf. Magill and Quinzii (1996)]. A commodity vector x 2 R3 is written as
x = (x0;x1), where x0 2 R corresponds to t = 0 and x1 2 R2 corresponds to
t = 1. An allocation (y;x1;x2) is constrained feasible if it can be implemented by a
planner who simultaneously determines the production plan y = (y0;y1) 2 Y , the
shares #i of all consumers and who, moreover, freely redistributes good 0. More











0+y0 and there exist shares #i ¸ 0 such that xi
1 = #iy1
for all i and
P
i #i = 1. Note that the set of constrained feasible allocations
does not depend on how the aggregate endowment of good 0 is distributed across
consumers and that it is, in general, larger than the set of market equilibria. A
constrained feasible allocation is called constrained eﬃcient if there does not exist
a Pareto superior constrained feasible allocation.
In searching for constrained eﬃcient market equilibria we can restrict atten-
tion to the set of Dr` eze equilibria since a constrained eﬃcient market equilibrium
is a Dr` eze equilibrium.
In DDG (2002) we present an example of a ﬁnance economy with a unique, but
constrained ineﬃcient Dr` eze equilibrium. Thus, the market is unable to achieve
constrained eﬃciency in the example. Therefore, we are led to ask the question
of whether the eﬃciency requirements can be relaxed such that the market can
at least achieve an extremely weak form of constrained eﬃciency.
The planner who can implement constrained eﬃcient allocations is more pow-
erful than the market, since the planner can distribute consumption at t = 0
directly and aﬀect consumption at t = 1 indirectly by allocating shares to in-
dividuals. Clearly, to improve upon a market equilibrium, the planner must be
able to compensate the losers of a change of the available asset by reallocating
consumption at t = 0. Therefore, we cannot deprive the planner of the right
to distribute good 0. However, we take away the right to allocate shares. Since
the power of a planner who is deprived of this right cannot be further reduced,
a constrained feasible allocation is called minimally constrained eﬃcient if it is
not possible for a planner who does not possess the right to distribute shares, to
Pareto improve upon the allocation.
5More precisely, the economy with the weakened planner can be described
as follows. First the planner chooses ¸. Given ¸, each consumer i selects the
optimal investment ®i(¸) such that the resulting consumption plan (xi
0;xi
1) =
ei +®i(¸)(¡1;¸;1¡¸) maximizes i’s utility in the budget set associated with i’s




at t = 0, but cannot aﬀect individual consumption xi
1 at t = 1 and ¸. That
is to say, whenever the planner has chosen ¸, the stock market opens and each
consumer i chooses (xi
0;xi
1) = ei + ®i(¸)(¡1;¸;1 ¡ ¸) optimally. Then the stock
market is closed and nobody, including the planner, can change xi
1. After the
stock market is closed the planner can redistribute good 0.
Deﬁnition . A constrained feasible allocation is called minimally constrained

















i ®i(¸)(¡1;¸;1 ¡ ¸) 2 Y .
Condition (i) says that, after the planner has chosen the production ray, indi-
vidual consumption at t = 1 is determined by the market. Condition (ii) states






t = 0. Condition (iii) says that the planner adjusts the level of production to the
consumers’ aggregate investment.
Our method of deﬁning minimal constrained eﬃciency can, in principle, also
be used if there are several goods in each state. In this case, even equilibria
with respect to ﬁxed sets of assets are typically constrained ineﬃcient due to
price eﬀects. Therefore, Grossman (1977) weakened the deﬁnition of constrained
eﬃciency by introducing a central planner with incomplete coordination. We
compare our planner with Grossman’s. Grossman’s planner cannot act simul-
taneously in diﬀerent states, but our planner is not even allowed to act in any
state other than s = 0. At s = 0 , our planner is, apart from the ability to
choose ¸, weaker than Grossman’s, since shareholdings and individual consump-
tion at t = 1 are determined by individual optimization. Our planner can only
redistribute the resources at s = 0 that are not used for production, whereas
Grossman’s planner can also allocate shares.
Numerical computation shows that the unique Dr` eze equilibrium in the exam-
ple in DDG (2002) is minimally constrained eﬃcient although it is not constrained
eﬃcient. This fact can be explained as follows. The example is driven by strong
income eﬀects: The optimal investment of the ﬁrst consumer depends strongly
on his wealth and, therefore, on the sidepayment obtained from the planner.
However, in the case of minimal eﬃciency this eﬀect ceases to play a role since
individual investments in shares are, by deﬁnition, independent of sidepayments.
Since the mechanism driving the example in DDG (2002) cannot be used in the
case of minimal constrained eﬃciency, one would like to know whether at least
one Dr` eze equilibrium in a ﬁnance economy is minimally constrained eﬃcient.
63 Can the Market Achieve Minimal Constrained
Eﬃciency?
In order to answer this question we proceed as follows. First we present and
discuss a quasilinear example. Due to the existence of a representative consumer,
a constrained eﬃcient Dr` eze equilibrium necessarily exists. Then we introduce
small income eﬀects by perturbing the example slightly and analyze how the
perturbation aﬀects the eﬃciency properties of the Dr` eze equilibria.
In the unperturbed example, consumers have quasilinear utilities given by
U




2(x0;x1;x2) = x0 + x
0:6
2 ;
respectively. We assume ¸ = 0:1;¸ = 0:9 and e1 = e2 = (2;0;0). It turns out
that the economy under consideration has three Dr` eze equilibria, A;B and C,
corresponding to ¸A = 0:1;¸B = 0:5, and ¸C = 0:9, respectively.
In the deﬁnition of a Dr` eze equilibrium, shares are kept ﬁxed when share-
holders evaluate alternative production plans. In order to gain insight into the
consequences of this feature, it is useful to investigate the interior equilibrium B.
To do so, we ﬁrst consider the indirect utility u1(2;¸) that consumer 1 obtains,
if the ﬁrm chooses the ray ¸ and if consumer 1 makes the optimal investment
®1(¸) = 0:6(0:6¸)1:5. Since this utility equals u1(2;¸) = 2 + 0:4(0:6¸)1:5, the
function u1(2;¢) is convex. Similarly, the utility level of consumer 2 at ¸ equals
u2(2;¸) = u1(2;1¡¸) and is convex in ¸. As a consequence, shareholders’ social
surplus associated with the ray ¸, u1(2;¸) + u2(2;¸), is convex in ¸. Due to the
symmetry between u1(2;¸) and u2(2;¸), the social surplus has a critical point at
¸B = 0:5, which must be a global minimum [see Figure 1].
Observe that the situation changes drastically if the shareholders are deprived
of the possibility of adjusting their shares, or, equivalently, their investment levels,
when ¸B is tested against some alternative ¸. Consider consumer 1 who wants
to choose the investment level ®1(¸) in proportion to ¸1:5. If ®1 is now taken as
ﬁxed at its value at ¸B = 0:5, then the utility reached at ray ¸ equals ˜ u1(2;¸) =
c0 + c1¸0:6 with c1 > 0, whereas the indirect utility with share adjustment is a
function of the type u1(2;¸) = c0
0+c0
1¸1:5 with c0
1 > 0. Thus, by disregarding how
consumer 1’s individual investment level ®1(¸) varies with ¸, the originally convex
function u1(2;¢) is turned into a concave function ˜ u1(2;¢). As a consequence,
˜ u1(2;¢) + ˜ u2(2;¢) is a concave function and the critical point ¸ = 0:5 becomes a
maximum. For this reason, ¸B yields a Dr` eze equilibrium. Clearly, the utility
sum ˜ u1(2;¢)+ ˜ u2(2;¢) constructed by ﬁxing the shares does not represent owners’
welfare at alternative production rays correctly.
70.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Figure 1: Surplus minimum at the Dr` eze equilibrium ¸B = 0:5
At the Dr` eze equilibria A and C, consumers’ social surplus is maximized.
Hence, A and C are constrained eﬃcient.
Now we perturb the quasilinear example by altering the utility derived from
consumption at t = 0 without changing the utility obtained from consumption















where 0 < a · 0:1. It is easy to show that i’s utility function is quasiconcave in
the relevant range.
As in the unperturbed example, the production ray varies in the interval
[0:1;0:9] and there are three Dr` eze equilibria corresponding to ¸A = 0:1, ¸B = 0:5,
and ¸C = 0:9, respectively. However, the boundary equilibria are no longer
constrained eﬃcient for any a > 0. Moreover, the boundary equilibria are not
even minimally constrained eﬃcient.
Proposition . For arbitrarily small a > 0, no market equilibrium associated with
some ray ¸ is minimally constrained eﬃcient.
Proof. Consider any ray ¸ and the corresponding market equilibrium allocation.
Clearly, the equilibrium corresponding to ¸B = 0:5 is not minimally constrained
eﬃcient. Therefore, let ¸ 6= 0:5. We show that the production ray 1¡¸, together
with a suitable reallocation of consumption at t = 0 is preferred to ¸ by both
types of consumers. Due to symmetry we can assume ¸ < 0:5.
Agent i consumes xi(¸) 2 Bi(¸) when the ray ¸ is chosen. If ¸ is replaced by
1 ¡ ¸, agent i consumes xi(1 ¡ ¸) and achieves the utility level Ui
a(xi(1 ¡ ¸)) 6=
8Ui
a(xi(¸)). Let ¿i be the amount of good 0 required in addition to xi(1 ¡ ¸) in



















Since ¸ < 0:5 < 1 ¡ ¸, we have ¿1 < 0 and ¿2 > 0. Moreover, by symmetry,
x1
0(¸) = x2













1(1 ¡ ¸)): (4)










0(1 ¡ ¸) + ¿
2x
1
0(¸)) = 0: (5)
Since calculation of consumer 1’s optimal shares yields that the demand for good
zero is strictly decreasing, we have x1
0(¸) > x1
0(1 ¡ ¸) > 0.
Assume that ¿1+¿2 ¸ 0 and, hence, ¿2 ¸ j¿1j. Then ¿2x1
0(¸)) > j¿1x1
0(1¡¸)j.
Therefore, the left hand side of (5) must be strictly positive for every a > 0,
which is a contradiction. We conclude that ¿1 + ¿2 < 0. Hence, the equilibrium
corresponding to ¸ is not minimally constrained eﬃcient.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Figure 2: Intersecting total “saving” functions
Figure2illustratestheargument. Taketheequilibriumat0 :1 and consider the
sidepayment ¿1(¸) necessary to keep consumer 1 at the utility level U1
a(x1(0:1))









9Let ¿2(¸) be deﬁned in a similar way. Thus, ¿1(¸) + ¿2(¸) speciﬁes the total
amount of compensation required to maintain the utility levels achieved at 0.1.
The relationship to Figure 1 becomes clearer if the compensation is replaced by
¡(¿1(¸) + ¿2(¸)), which is the amount of good 0 that can be saved at ¸ while
keeping consumer i on the utility level Ui
a(xi(0:1)). This total “saving” function
becomes positive at ¸ = 0:9, which indicates that the equilibrium with respect to
¸ = 0:1 is not minimally constrained eﬃcient. A similar saving function can be
deﬁned if the other boundary ¸ = 0:9 is taken as the reference point. If a goes to
0, both curves in Figure 2 approach the social surplus curve depicted in Figure 1
(up to a constant).
The nonexistence of constrained eﬃcient and minimally constrained market
equilibria is caused by the following facts. First, the example is built upon a
nonconvexity. In the unperturbed, quasilinear example, the nonconvexity can be
described as follows. The amount of good 0 initially available in the economy
just suﬃces to maintain the utility proﬁle (u1(2;0:1); u2(2;0:1)) reached at the
boundary point ¸ = 0:1, if the other boundary point ¸ = 0:9 is chosen. However,
if the ﬁrm implements any ray ¸ strictly between 0.1 and 0.9, this amount is
insuﬃcient. Second, as soon as the perturbation parameter a becomes positive,
the graphs of the two saving functions intersect each other. To maintain the
proﬁle (u1
a(2;0:1); u2
a(2;0:1)) at ¸ = 0:9, one can dispense with a positive amount
of good 0. A similar statement holds if the two boundary points are interchanged
[cf. Figure 2]. These two features cannot be ruled out in general. Therefore, one
cannot expect the market to be able to achieve minimally constrained eﬃcient
outcomes.3
The allocations attainable by the market depend on the initial allocation of
endowments. To obtain a situation in which a constrained eﬃcient market equi-
librium exists in the perturbed example, a lump sum redistribution of initial en-
dowments is required. Markets do not perform such redistributions and thus, are
less powerful than even the very weak planner discussed in the context of minimal
constrained eﬃciency. The importance of the initially determined distribution of
wealth in nonconvex environments was ﬁrst pointed out by Guesnerie (1975) in
the framework of complete markets and nonconvex production sets. Guesnerie
showed that all marginal cost pricing equilibria can be ineﬃcient, even though
Pareto eﬃciency requires prices to equal marginal costs.
3It has been emphasized in the literature on compensation criteria ` a la Hicks and Kaldor
that intersecting utility possibility frontiers often entail inconsistent policy recommendations
[see, e.g., Gravel (2001)].
104 Concluding Remarks
We have seen that shareholders’ social surplus can reach its minimum at a Dr` eze
equilibrium if all shareholders have quasilinear utilities. This is due to the fact
that the deﬁnition of a Dr` eze equilibrium only takes welfare changes of ﬁrst order
into account. Thus, no distinction is made between an interior maximum and
any other critical point.
In the quasilinear case, a constrained eﬃcient Dr` eze equilibrium exists. There-
fore, it is tempting to reﬁne the Dr` eze equilibria in order to rule out constrained
ineﬃcient allocations. However, our example shows that this endeavor can fail to
provide any solution as soon as one deviates from the quasilinear setting: Arbi-
trarily small income eﬀects render all market equilibria constrained ineﬃcient.
Moreover, even if the eﬃciency requirements are substantially reduced, they
can remain unfulﬁlled at every market equilibrium in a ﬁnance economy. In our
example the stock market cannot even achieve a minimally constrained eﬃcient
outcome if the quasilinear setting is abandoned. Hence, the existence of a con-
strained eﬃcient equilibrium in the quasilinear economy should be viewed as an
artifact lacking any robustness.
Clearly, there are economies in which the problem does not arise. For exam-
ple, Dr` eze equilibria are constrained eﬃcient if there is only one ﬁrm and if every
consumer’s indirect utility function is quasiconcave. This function describes the
maximum amount of utility the consumer can derive from a production decision
at diﬀerent levels of wealth at t = 0. The indirect utility functions underlying
Figure 1 are not quasiconcave. This is due to the fact that the speciﬁcation of
the direct utility functions Ui makes optimal shareholdings suﬃciently sensitive
to changes in the production ray.4 Since the indirect utility depends on how the
optimal number of shares that an individual holds varies with the asset span and
individual wealth at t = 0, it is, unless attention is restricted to particularly sim-
ple examples, quite diﬃcult to state economically meaningful conditions ensuring
the quasiconcavity of indirect utility functions. We do not think that imposing
restrictions on consumers’ characteristics presents a promising approach to over-
come the problem of nonexistence of constrained eﬃcient market equilibria.
It has been suggested to us to use lotteries instead of deterministic allocations.
A similar approach has been successfully applied in other settings. Cole and
Prescott (1997), for instance, use random allocations to analyze equilibria in
economies with clubs. Club membership is indivisible and lotteries are used to
restore convexity. Lotteries have also been used to overcome the nonconvexity
of the set of feasible allocations in economies with adverse selection. In that
case, the nonconvexity is due to individual incentive constraints and eliminated
4If the power 0.6 in the deﬁnition of Ui is replaced by a number below 0.5, quasiconcavity
of the indirect utility function ui results.
11by introducing random allocations; see Prescott and Townsend (1984). In this
paper, the diﬃculty is not due to a nonconvexity on the individual level but to a
pure public good problem.
In our framework, random allocations could be introduced by making the
production decision stochastic and letting consumers choose their investments
contingent on the realization. More speciﬁcally, consider the set U = f(u1;u2) ·
(u1(2;¸);u2(2;¸)) j ¸ 2 [0:1;0:9]g of vectors that are below a utility proﬁle at-
tained at some market equilibrium in the quasilinear example. The set U is
nonconvex. Let the production ray become random and consumers have von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. If consumers are allowed to choose
their investments after they have learned the realization of ¸ the set U is con-
vexiﬁed. More precisely, the convex hull of U is generated by the two proﬁles
(u1(2;¸);u2(2;¸)) associated with the boundary equilibria ¸ = 0:1 and ¸ = 0:9.
In comparison to the deterministic market equilibrium at ¸ = 0:5, both con-
sumers are better oﬀ in expectation if the ﬁrm chooses a symmetric lottery over
¸ = 0:1 and ¸ = 0:9.
In the example the procedure corresponds to the introduction of a veil of ig-
norance. Before the lottery takes place it is not known whose favorite production
ray will be realized. This ex ante viewpoint is appropriate for certain fairness
considerations, but appears unnatural in the analysis of the eﬃciency of equilib-
ria in economies with incomplete markets. The introduction of lotteries does not
provide a genuine extension of the Arrow-Debreu-McKenzie theory to the case
of incomplete markets. Furthermore, introducing lotteries amounts to making
markets more complete. Our goal, however, is to analyze eﬃciency issues in a
model with a given, small set of assets.5 Since the introduction of lotteries over
production plans is diﬃcult to justify on economic grounds and since it changes
the nature of the underlying problem in an essential way, we do not think that
the use of lotteries lends itself to the present framework.
Majority voting presents another way to overcome the social choice problems
faced by shareholders. For properties of corporate control by majority voting,
see DeMarzo (1993) and Geraats and Haller (1998). Apart from problems such
as equilibrium existence, agenda control, non sincere voting etc., the following
point deserves attention. Since the voting outcome depends on power, it need
not reﬂect welfare properly. The point is easily understood in the context of the
quasilinear example in Section 3. To break ties, a third quasilinear consumer
with arbitrarily small weight is introduced, whose utility increases if the ray ¸
approaches 0:5. This additional consumer becomes the median voter. Due to
symmetry, majority voting leads to ¸ = 0:5 if every shareholder has one vote.
Moreover, it is not diﬃcult to modify the example such that voting according to
5In addition, even if the set of market equilibria is convexiﬁed, it diﬀers substantially from
the set of constrained eﬃcient allocations. We do not see how one would obtain an analogue
to the ﬁrst welfare theorem.
12the one share-one vote rule yields the same outcome. The median voter, although
of arbitrarily small weight, has overwhelming power. The median voter’s optimal
choice, though, is the welfare minimum. Thus, majority voting should be seen as
a modelling device that is better suited for positive than for normative purposes.
Instead of examining whether a proposed production plan can be unanimously
improved upon after sidepayments are made, one can compare the gains, ex-
pressed in units of good 0, that are obtained from any production plan in com-
parison to a given reference point. In the perturbed quasilinear example the point
of zero production, that is to say, the allocation (e1;e2) of initial endowments,
can be used for reference. Consumer i’s surplus Si(¸) is given by the amount of
good 0 consumer i needs in excess of ei to obtain the same utility level as if the
ﬁrm chose the ray ¸. The total surplus
P
i Si(¸) associated with some market
equilibrium can then be maximized. In the perturbed quasilinear example the
maximum is taken at both boundary points ¸ = 0:1 and ¸ = 0:9. Thus, the same
outcome as in the quasilinear case is obtained.
A major advantage of this approach lies in the fact that it relies on the max-
imization of continuous functions rather than maximization of incomplete, in-
transitive, and nonconvex relations. The surplus maximum is characterized as
follows: It presents the minimum amount of good 0 needed in the absence of the
ﬁrm in order to be able to compensate all consumers such that they can attain
every utility proﬁle that is induced by some production decision. Clearly, this
type of surplus maximization, which is motivated by the lack of constrained eﬃ-
cient market equilibria, does not aim at achieving constrained eﬃciency and its
theoretical foundation remains controversial.
The surplus function described above can be viewed as a particular social
welfare function. To overcome the problem of the nonexistence of constrained or
even minimally constrained eﬃcient market equilibria, one might also resort to
any other social welfare function. However, it is a priori unclear which welfare
function is particularly well suited for this purpose.6
A less radical procedure suggesting itself in the perturbed quasilinear example
is the choice of the boundary equilibria ¸ = 0:1 or ¸ = 0:9 on the basis that they
are “less ineﬃcient” than, say, ¸ = 0:5. To deﬁne the degree of ineﬃciency,
interpersonal utility comparisons are not required.
The last three approaches provide welfare oriented methods that may be used
to overcome the problem presented in this paper. In each case a particular func-
tion is optimized. These approaches require a large amount of information and
are far more complex than the usual proﬁt maximization in General Equilibrium
Theory with complete markets. They would change the character of the theory
considerably.
6In another context involving lotteries, Dhillon and Mertens (1999) argue in favor of relative
utilitarianism.
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